EXHIBIT 10

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 3 : Civil No. 16-md-2687-MCA 4 IN RE: LIQUID ALUMINUM 5 ANTITRUST LITIGATION TRANSCRIPT OF 6 7 ----x HEARING ON MOTION; FAIRNESS HEARING 8 9 Martin Luther King Courthouse 50 Walnut Street 10 Newark, New Jersey 07102 September 26, 2019 11 12 13 BEFORE: 14 THE HON. MADELINE COX ARLEO, U.S.D.J. 15 16 17 18 19 20 Reported by: CHARLES P. McGUIRE, C.C.R. 21 Official Court Reporter 22 23 Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography; transcript produced by computer-aided transcription. 24 25

2 1 **APPEARANCES:** CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. 2 5 Becker Farm Road Roseland, New Jersey 07068 3 BY: JAMES E. CECCHI, ESQ., and LINDSAY H. TAYLOR, ESQ. 4 Attorneys for Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs 5 LITE DePALMA GREENBERG, LLP 570 Broad Street 6 Newark, New Jersey 07102 7 BY: BRUCE D. GREENBERG, ESQ. Attorney for Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs 8 STEARNS WEAVER MILLER 9 150 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 BY: JAY B. SHAPIRO, ESQ. 10 Attorney for Plaintiff City of Homestead 11 PORZIO BROMBERG & NEWMAN, PC 100 Southgate Parkway 12 Morristown, New Jersey 07962 BY: JOHN S. MAIRO, ESQ., 13 WILLIAM J. HUGHES, JR., ESQ., and 14 KELLY CURTIN, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants Southern Ionics, Inc. and Milton Sundbeck 15 SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP 16 500 East Pratt Street 17 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 BY: KAYLEIGH T. KEILTY, ESQ. Attorney for Defendants Delta Chemical Corporation 18 and John D. Besson and Rebecca L. Besson 19 ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER 20 250 West 55th Street New York, New York 10019 BY: AARON RUBINSTEIN, ESQ., and 21 PAUL ANDREWS, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants American Securities, LLC, 22 Matthew Labaron, and Scott Wolff 23 24 25

3 1 **APPEARANCES:** 2 WHITEFORD TAYLOR PRESTON LLP 7 St. Paul Street 3 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 BY: WILLIAM F. RYAN, JR., ESQ., and 4 AARON CASAGRANDE, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendant Usalco, LLC 5 WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 767 Fifth Avenue 6 New York, New York 10153 BY: KAYLEIGH GOLISH, ESQ. 7 Attorney for Defendants General Chemical and Chemtrade 8 LOEVY & LOEVY 9 311 North Aberdeen Street Chicago, Illinois 60607 10 BY: JULIA RICKERT, ESQ. Attorney for Intervenor Lawrence McShane 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

	4
1	THE COURT CLERK: All rise.
2	THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone.
3	all right. We're here in In Re Liquid Aluminum
4	Sulfate Antitrust Litigation.
5	Can I have appearances, please?
6	MR. CECCHI: May it please the Court.
7	James Cecchi on behalf of the direct purchaser
8	class. With me is my partner, Lindsay Taylor.
9	THE COURT: Okay. Hello, everyone.
10	MR. TAYLOR: Hello, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Okay.
12	MR. GREENBERG: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
13	Bruce Greenberg from Lite DePalma Greenberg, also
14	on behalf of the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs Executive
15	Committee.
16	THE COURT: All right.
17	MR. MAIRO: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
18	John Mairo, Bill Hughes, Kelly Curtin from Porzio
19	Bromberg & Newman on behalf of Southern Ionics,
20	Incorporated.
21	THE COURT: Okay.
22	MR. RUBENSTEIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
23	Aaron Rubinstein and Paul Andrews from Arnold &
24	Porter Kaye Scholer on behalf of Defendant American
25	Securities.

1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. RYAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Bill Ryan, together with Aaron Casagrande on my 3 4 right. We represent Usalco LLC. THE COURT: Okay. Thanks for coming in, everyone. I know some of you have traveled a little bit of distance. 6 I appreciate your coming today. 7 And we have a couple parties on the phone. 8 9 MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, this is Jay Shapiro from 10 the Stearns Weaver firm. I'm here on behalf of the indirect 11 purchaser plaintiff class. 12 THE COURT: Okay. All right, everyone, have a seat. 13 14 Okay. So, we're here to approve a settlement that 15 had been reached between the parties. 16 In that regard, I do have a brief from the direct purchaser plaintiffs' motion for final approval of a 17 18 settlement with Southern Ionics, Usalco, and American Securities, and for an award of counsel fees. 19 20 And I should note that I preliminarily approved this settlement earlier this spring, and that, today, we're 21 here for final settlement. 22 The brief that I received states that there are no 23 objections to the settlement. Is that still the case? 24 MR. CECCHI: Judge, there is --25

```
6
1
                 THE COURT: There's an intervenor.
2
                MR. CECCHI: -- one proposed intervenor, and a
      proposed objection, and counsel is here.
3
                 THE COURT: Okay. So let me hear from -- come on
4
      forward. You can come up to the podium.
5
                 I should note for the record that I did get a
6
7
      brief by Mr. McShane to intervene.
                Are you representing Mr. McShane?
8
9
                MS. RICKERT: I am.
                Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is Julia
10
11
      Rickert, R-i-c-k-e-r-t.
                 THE COURT: Are you a member of the bar of
12
      New Jersey?
13
14
                MS. RICKERT: I have been admitted pro hac.
15
                THE COURT: Okay.
                MS. RICKERT: So, Your Honor, I'm here today to
16
17
      argue this motion to intervene.
                 THE COURT: Well, I got your motion, and let me
18
      just put it in some factual context.
19
20
                 So your client has qui tam cases pending in state
21
      court.
22
                MS. RICKERT: Yes, two in Illinois state court and
      one in Virginia state court.
23
                 THE COURT: Right, and in those qui tam claims, he
24
      is claiming fraud on behalf of some of the municipal parties
25
```

who were party to this action. Correct?

MS. RICKERT: Well, that's true of the Chicago case, which is in the Illinois court. The other two cases, to be precise, are brought on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia for fraud against municipalities in Virginia, and the other is brought on behalf of the state of Illinois for fraud that was committed against the municipalities, but in both of those cases, it is the state that will obtain any recovery from the cases. The municipalities are not guaranteed anything.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're new to this case, but I have the ample record of Judge Linares, who has twice addressed your motion to intervene, and I can read you from an order that's found at the electronic docket at 1169, dated December 3rd of 2018, almost a year ago, and he says in paragraph five:

"The purpose of this order is to address

Mr. McShane's motion to intervene and object -- " -- and I

should state at this point there were other, ongoing

settlements; right? Some settlements had occurred before

this time and after this time, and there was some

preliminary approval going on.

MS. RICKERT: Yes, I believe that the order you're talking about was from the Geo settlement.

THE COURT: Right. So it's a similar context, but

with different defendants.

And he says:

"The purpose of this order is to address solely Mr. McShane's motion to intervene and object. Mr. McShane's motion to intervene is denied because, as explained on the record, Mr. McShane is not a member of either the direct purchaser plaintiffs or the indirect purchaser plaintiffs, and thus has no standing to intervene in this action for the purposes of objecting to the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)."

MS. RICKERT: Yes.

THE COURT: And this was reiterated in a later order of his, I'm not sure if it was a written order or at oral argument. Neither of these orders were appealed or attempted to be appealed to the 3rd Circuit.

The brief that I have from you today that was filed on September 12th doesn't even address the standing issue, which was the basis of both -- or more appropriately address anything about the analysis of Judge Linares with respect to standing in either of his prior two decisions.

MS. RICKERT: Your Honor, in the motion to intervene, we did make an argument about why law of the case should not apply here, because part of Judge Linares's reasoning that there was no standing, yes, he said, not a class member. Now, that is for standing under Rule 23. If

Mr. McShane was a class member, there would be no reason to file a motion to intervene under Rule 24. Judge Linares said based on representations from class counsel and defense counsel that Mr. McShane's concern about the potential release of his claims was speculative and supposition because there had been no action taken in the state courts to dismiss his claims, and for that reason, it would be an advisory opinion, et cetera.

So our argument on the standing point is that we qualify under Rule 24(a)(2) as of right, and that the circumstances have changed since Judge Linares made his ruling in that, now, the Defendants who have previously settled, Geo, the Chemtrade Defendants, have actually filed motions to dismiss based on the settlement in this case, and so --

THE COURT: Judge Linares did not make a conditional ruling. In fact, in paragraph six, he says:

"Mr. McShane's objection to the settlement is denied. As the Court stated in the record of the hearing, the Court is not making a ruling that the approval of this settlement in any way affects Mr. McShane's qui tam action pending in three separate courts."

He just said you have no standing to intervene here. What happens in state court happens in state court. There's nothing that I saw in his orders that his finding

was predicated on, if your motion is denied, you're invited to come back and renew your motion here.

MS. RICKERT: Well, he did say during the hearing that if this were to happen that the...

My apologies.

Judge Linares did ask repeatedly whether there had been any motions filed and did say that it would be dealt with at that time if such a motion were filed.

THE COURT: I don't see that in your brief, and I certainly didn't see it in the record. So you said he said something, and if you have a transcript in front of you, I think it would be helpful to know precisely what was said at the hearing. You didn't provide the Court with a copy of that transcript.

MS. RICKERT: I apologize. I thought that we did provide a copy of the transcript, but if we did not, I'm sorry for that. If you can just give me one moment, I will...

Okay. So in the transcript from April -- I'm sorry, this is the second hearing -- the Court said -- this is page 18, line 16 to 19 -- line 21, the Court said at the end -- well, first, defense counsel said:

"I think, Your Honor, there's certainly been no motions filed in the qui tam case and any speculation about what will happen is just that, speculation."

And the Court said:

"Right. So if that were, in fact, to happen, you're going to have to deal with it at that point, but at this point, that is not before the Court."

So our understanding, at least --

THE COURT: Who said that?

MS. RICKERT: Judge Linares said that.

THE COURT: Read that again.

MS. RICKERT: "So if that were, in fact, to happen, you're going to have to deal with it at that point, but at this point, that is not before the Court."

THE COURT: I would really be stretching to read that as an invitation by Judge Linares to -- that his standing analysis would change based on just a filing. I mean, I think it was anticipated that that filing would be made, and there's been no ruling yet. And there's nothing -- he wrote an order specifically addressing the motion to intervene and said it's denied because he has no standing to intervene in this action. That one line does not change the written order in any way, shape, or form, and there's not even in your brief an underlying analysis of how the standing issue has changed.

MS. RICKERT: Well, we tried to clarify in the brief in support of the motion to intervene that we are moving under Rule 24, that we're not seeking to object as

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
class members under Rule 23. I think that Judge Linares's
order saying that there's no standing because Mr. McShane
isn't a class member, you know, may have misunderstood the
basis for our objection, which is under Rule 24. So we did
address that in the brief to clarify and explain the
criterion under 24(a)(2) and why we meet it.
          So I think we did make that argument in our brief
in support of the motion to intervene, and to the extent
that Judge Linares's previous decision was based strictly on
Mr. McShane's status as a non-class member, you know, that
that's error because that is not the standard under Rule 24.
So I would ask you to reconsider that decision as a
misstatement of the law.
          THE COURT: What did you move on before Judge
Linares in the motion to intervene?
          MS. RICKERT: We did cite 24(a)(2) at that time,
but he did not address Rule 24 in his order.
          THE COURT: So you moved under 24, he denied it,
and you didn't move for reconsideration; right?
          MS. RICKERT: Correct.
          THE COURT: And you didn't appeal it to the 3rd
Circuit.
          MS. RICKERT: No, we did not.
          THE COURT: And now you're asking me a year later
to reconsider his ruling.
```

```
MS. RICKERT: Well, this is a separate settlement,
1
2
      so I'm not even sure that the --
3
                 THE COURT: But it's not the settlement; it's the
4
      ruling.
               It's the same ruling.
                MS. RICKERT: I understand that the circumstance
5
      is very similar, it's a very similar settlement. As I said,
6
      I think that circumstances, factual circumstances have
7
      changed in that Mr. McShane's interest under Rule 24(a)(2)
8
9
      is much more concrete now. It is, again, not as a class
10
      member, but as a person who has an interest in claims that
11
      are purported to be released by the settlement. And I'd be
12
      happy to talk about the problems with that.
                 THE COURT: Well, let's talk about a couple of
13
      things.
14
15
                MS. RICKERT:
                               Sure.
16
                 THE COURT: And then I'll let defense counsel
17
      respond.
                 So, one of your clients or one of your qui tam
18
19
      entities is the City of Chicago; correct? They're a party
      in this lawsuit, and they have not objected to the
20
21
      settlement.
22
                MS. RICKERT: Correct.
                 THE COURT: All right.
23
                MS. RICKERT: Or at least, that's my
24
      understanding.
25
```

2

3

5

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: So what do you envision the intervention -- what your role would be if I were to let you intervene? With respect to Chicago.

MS. RICKERT: With respect to Chicago, so, you're right that there are slightly different issues between the Chicago case and the Illinois and Virginia cases. With the City of Chicago, the -- you know, first of all, I would note that the settlement language actually said that qui tam claims were released to the extent of the power of the signatory to release them.

Now, under the Chicago false claims ordinance, like the Federal False Claims Act and all of the state analogs, he who later brings the claim cannot have that claim dismissed over his or settled over his objection without a hearing on his objection and on the fairness of releasing these claims and a judicial determination that doing so is fair. So the city actually does not have the power to, you know, passively settle these claims under that statute, and if the city were reading the settlement agreement and saw the release language and the discussion of qui tams and saw that it said they're only released to the extent of the powers of the signatories to the agreement, they would know that the prerequisites for settlement had not being fulfilled and would not understand the claims to They would have no reason to object or opt be released.

out, necessarily.

When it comes to the state cases, the state interests are not protected here at all. The class counsel points out that, you know, the states have not -- have not opted out, they have no ability to opt out, that they are not class members, and their interest -- they have intervened in the sense that Mr. McShane, who represents the interests of those states in these actions, has intervened, and he has a statutory right to pursue these actions and his and the state's interests in them.

THE COURT: All right. Can I hear from Mr. Cecchi?

MR. CECCHI: Yes, Your Honor.

So, just to put this in context, these are the fourth, fifth, and sixth settlements of these antitrust claims on behalf of the direct purchaser class.

In the first settlement, Mr. McShane filed -- the Geo settlement, he filed essentially an identical motion, and Judge Linares's ruling was that he was not going to adjudicate the effect of the rulings. He was not going to give an advisory opinion. What he did do and what he said, and counsel was present when he said this, is, when the motions are filed in the state court cases, you will deal with it at that point in time.

So the argument that it was not contemplated or

that's a changed circumstance because now motions have been filed is not accurate.

And I can cite Your Honor to Judge Linares's language in the Geo settlement. What he said is, you will have your transcript and you can quote it in your position brief when it happens. When it happens, he was referring to the motion to dismiss the qui tam case. The argument that counsel just articulated about the inability to release the claims, the state claims, she has every right and every ability to articulate those arguments in the state court case. Indeed, that was the basis of the ruling that Judge Linares made: I am not going to adjudicate, I'm not going to interfere with that qui tam judge; you go deal with it there, because that's where it should be dealt with. It was specifically contemplated motions to dismiss would be filed.

Fast forward to April of '19: Same motion, same ruling. At that time, we made the argument. Judge

Linares -- it's law of the case at this point. They don't have standing. He specifically ruled that they have no right to intervene, and he held: Again, it's not for me; it's for the state court Judge.

So all of this was contemplated. This is exactly what was anticipated to happen, that the argument that counsel articulates, whether they can be released or not, that's what has been dealt with.

So now we're really at law of the case, and the only argument that's articulated as to why we don't have law of the case is because there's some changed circumstance is factually not consistent with the record, because it was anticipated that the motion would be filed in state court.

But there's a couple of very practical points that I want to raise about the Rule 24 argument.

Rule 24 says you can intervene if you have some right that's not being adequately protected by the people here, by class counsel, and that gives you a right to intervene.

The only argument Mr. McShane has ever articulated as to why he has a right to intervene is his alleged economic interest in the outcome of the qui tam cases. The case law is clear. We briefed it to Judge Linares, we cited it to Your Honor. That is not a reason to intervene under Rule 24.

The second practical argument I want to raise is, as counsel acknowledges, the City of Chicago is a class member. I represent the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago received direct-mail notice of this settlement, as it did all of the other settlements. Presumably, if the City of Chicago felt I was not an adequate representative of its interests, it could have come before Your Honor. It could have said something. If they wanted Mr. McShane to

represent them, opt them out, do anything, they could have come forward. They're a class member.

As to the states, if they have a statutory right to pursue these claims or if Mr. McShane has a statutory right to pursue these claims, he has every ability to do so in the state court and articulate his defenses to the motion to dismiss.

So nothing has changed vis-a-vis Rule 24 or the fact that Mr. McShane is not a class member. He's not a purchaser of alum. So under whatever rule you want to look at, he has no standing.

So we -- excuse me, Your Honor.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. CECCHI: Finally, Mr. Taylor has pointed out, the final point is, these agreements before Your Honor are agreements between the Defendants and class counsel and the direct purchaser class. The law is, as much power as an Article III judge has, the law is that you can't rewrite the agreements for us.

So, the agreements are before Your Honor. Either they're fair, reasonable, and adequate, or they're not.

So he's asking you to do something you can't do, and I am always loath to say that to an Article III judge, but that's just what the law is. We have voluntary agreements. The release language is what it is. I can't

opine what the state judge is going to do. If counsel has meritorious arguments, presumably, she will win; if she does not, presumably, she will not.

So, nothing has changed. We think this is now law of the case squared.

His motion should be denied.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything you want to add?

MS. RICKERT: Yes, if I may.

I would say, first of all, the idea that economic interest isn't enough under Rule 24, that's not telling the whole story.

Association -- and, I'm sorry, I didn't have time to file a reply to their brief, but it's 72 F.3d 361, a 3rd Circuit case, talks about how -- yet the mere fact that a lawsuit may impede a third party's ability to recover in a separate suit isn't enough, but what it's talking about, it's very explicit about this, is when someone is saying, those defendants won't have any money left for my suit if this settlement happens. Now, that isn't enough. But when you actually have a claim that is purportedly being released, that is a different situation.

And Mr. McShane doesn't just have an interest in a recovery under the law. I mean, the Supreme Court has said

in <u>Vermont Agency Natural Resources</u> that -- this is the Federal Fraud Claims Act, which is identical to the ones at issue here -- "The statute gives the relator himself an interest in the lawsuit and not merely the right to retain a fee out of recovery." And the Court goes on to say for that reason, you know, the government is prohibited from settling the suit over relator's objection without a judicial determination of fairness.

So there's no question about McShane's interest. And the idea that the state's interests are protected here in any way is false. The measure of damages in our case is very, very different than the measure of damages in this one. These are fraud claims. These are about actions taken after the anticompetitive conspiracy was formed to defraud the Government, and the fact is that the measure of damages is not the difference between the fair market value and the inflated price, it's -- there's fraudulent inducement here. So we're talking about the full value of the contract.

Additionally, the government can -- fines are available under these statues for each false claim and each invoice, and none of that is considered, I assume, by the fairness analysis that you're conducting. And Rule 23 doesn't simply wipe, you know, wipe away the state laws and make them ineffective. The states couldn't opt out, the state's interests are not being protected here, and I think

it was, you know, a mistaken ruling before to exclude us on standing grounds, and I would ask you to reconsider that and consider the objection.

And if I may just add one more thing, there are two possibilities. Either these are -- two cases. Either class counsel said yes, we have the ability to release these claims and would like to be paid for that and there is consideration, or they haven't received consideration, in which case this release would, you know, be a nullity.

I think it's well within your authority to figure out what this settlement agreement means. I think that it makes sense to find out whether they're purporting to release what I believe are valuable claims brought by the persons who blew the whistle on this entire scheme, the Department of Justice, and, you know, they should be able to articulate what exactly is happening here and what they're releasing and under what authority. You know, they do not have the authority to release, they have represented that they do, that was incorrect, and defense counsel should be aware of that.

THE COURT: All right. I just want to take a quick look at something Judge Linares wrote. I want to take a quick break, and I'll be back.

Mr. Cecchi, do you want to finish your point before I take a break?

MR. CECCHI: Very quickly, Your Honor.

The claims that are being released here are the claims that we asserted, the class claims. We didn't assert qui tam claims. The arguments that counsel is articulating presumably she has articulated to the judge in the state court, and I'm not going to offer an advisory opinion, just like Judge Linares didn't offer an advisory opinion.

MS. RICKERT: If I may, very briefly.

It's not an advisory opinion to determine whether these claims are currently, right now, being released by this settlement. These aren't hypothetical claims; these are cases that exist, that are ongoing. I do expect to prevail in the arguments in those cases.

But I would just point out that the Defendants get an extra argument when you approve a settlement because then they're arguing res judicata as well. Now, I don't think that --

THE COURT: It's not res judicata because you're not a party to this lawsuit.

MS. RICKERT: Well, yes, we have arguments against that, but --

THE COURT: Well, it's not even close. I mean, the issue is, the release does not address qui tam claims. You're not a party to this lawsuit. Res judicata wouldn't apply.

And I want to take a look at what Judge Linares said, because, frankly, you said twice that Judge Linares got it wrong, and what is this; there have been six settlements? This has been raised three times, it's been rejected three times on solid grounds and on a reasonable basis on your motion to intervene, and there was never a motion for reconsideration even filed, and there was certainly never an appeal to the 3rd Circuit filed.

So after -- this is the sixth settlement?

MR. CECCHI: Fourth, fifth, and sixth.

THE COURT: Fourth, fifth, and sixth with the three most recent parties. So, we had three before this, Judge Linares made his rulings, and now a new judge comes into the case, and there is no doubt in my mind that this issue probably would not even have been raised, certainly with the force that it's raised now, if Judge Linares was here.

MS. RICKERT: I disagree. I --

THE COURT: Well, I can assure you of something:

If Judge Linares was here, it would be summarily denied,

because he's been so clear about it.

And I just want to look at his precise language, because the language you pointed out that suggested that Judge Linares was inviting a motion, another intervention motion, a later intervention motion, if the motion was

filed, it seems ambiguous to me, number one, and, number two, it wouldn't make sense anyway, because, if these settlements had occurred, you know, the next day, a year ago instead of today, they would be done, there would be a final judgment, and you wouldn't be able to even make the argument because the motions were subsequently filed.

So it seems that when you said the changed circumstances are the filing of motions, it doesn't seem to be a changed circumstance because that was clearly something that could have been anticipated by, was anticipated by the parties years ago, and it didn't change his ruling. His ruling was, as Mr. Cecchi pointed out, you can raise it there in state court.

MR. CECCHI: Judge, I have the transcripts if that would assist Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, I'm going to take a look at them.

MR. CECCHI: And I can point you to, Your Honor, the Geo settlement, it's 38:11 to 39:23. That's the transcript of November 14th, 2018, where the Court says, you know, when the issue is raised in the state court case, raise these issues there to the state court judge. I mean, that's the context.

THE COURT: And remind me what the release language says in this case.

MR. CECCHI: The release is a broad release. It

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
does say qui tam claims. The arguments are, however, that
we don't have the ability to release qui tam claims, and
that argument was articulated once, twice, three times.
first two times, Judge Linares said, I'm not opining on
that; go to the state court, because, if they can't release
it, you have a qui tam case pending. If I can't release the
state qui tam claims, well, presumably, that's what the
judge will rule.
          And Mr. Newell, who is counsel's partner, agreed
with that analysis. What he said is -- the Court asked --
what the Court says is:
          "This is not to indicate what, if anything, should
be the decision on the qui tam actions at the state court."
          "Mr. Muchnick," counsel for Geo: "I agree."
          "Mr. Cecchi: We're in agreement as well.
          "All right, Mr. Newell," says the Court.
          "Mr. Newell: Yes, I think that is fine, Your
Honor."
          THE COURT: Let me ask you one more question.
Hypothetically, if you were to intervene, your purpose in
intervening would be to say, we're a party now or an
intervenor, and we object to the language in the release.
That's your point.
          MS. RICKERT: No, we don't actually object to the
language --
```

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: I'm just trying to understand what you would envision your role is if I were to grant your motion. MS. RICKERT: Sure. All we would really want is an order recognizing that the release language, which is limited to the power of the signatories to the agreement to release qui tam claims, that these signatories do not have that power, and therefore, the claims are not released. THE COURT: So you want in this case -- that's all you want to do. You want to make sure there's clear language that says qui tam isn't released; right? And what if -- even though you really don't have any direct interest in the settlement here, right --MS. RICKERT: Well --THE COURT: I know you have a general interest because money is fungible, but you don't have a direct claim here. If they agreed to that language today, and we put the settlement through, you don't obtain anything as a result of the settlement. And if Defendants say, we're not agreeing to that language, then we have to go forward with the trial because you don't agree? I mean, I don't even understand how it would go forward. MS. RICKERT: Well --

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
THE COURT: In other words, because, what if they
say, we're absolutely not agreeing to that language; we've
negotiated this, and we want a broad release, the language
is the language, and we're not settling. So then what
happens?
         MS. RICKERT: Well, the language is the language,
and as I said, it does actually carve out --
          THE COURT: Well, listen to my point.
         MS. RICKERT:
                        Sure.
          THE COURT: I let you in; and Defendants say,
we're not agreeing to that language, we want the same
language that we have right now.
         What happens?
         MS. RICKERT: Well, then, I would say, yes, this
language is fine in your order approving the settlement.
would ask that you include that --
          THE COURT: What if they object to it and say no?
So, in other words, what you're really asking for,
ultimately -- you don't have an interest in the outcome of
this case. What you have an interest in is having the Court
tell a state court judge how to interpret release language,
that no matter what the parties agreed to or don't agree to,
I'm going to tell them in the order approving the settlement
that it carves out the qui tam action for them.
really what you want, because, if they don't agree, you're
```

saying, well, Judge, they don't have to agree, the

Defendants, you can just basically rewrite the release

language in your order approving the settlement, or make a

carve-out.

MS. RICKERT: Right, there is a carve-out. It's the release language which they don't, you know, quote as language in their brief, but the release language actually says that qui tam claims are being released to the extent of the power of the signatories to the agreements. And what I would want to be just an acknowledgment that they have not shown that they have the authority to --

THE COURT: So, in other words -- but that's my point: You want me to clarify language for really a third party who has no interest in this litigation, to clarify it so when you have your motion in state court: Judge Arleo has said that that's what the carve-out means, so that your motion is stronger. That's really what it is.

But what I'm saying is, that's really not the purpose of intervention, and that's why Judge Linares -- you're not a party to this lawsuit. You're coming in in an unrelated lawsuit, saying, there is a carve-out for you, but I want to make it crystal clear that that carve-out means that I can go forward in my state court action.

MS. RICKERT: Well, I think that you are the appropriate judge to say what the settlement is doing and

what exactly is being exchanged between these parties, so I think it would be -- I don't think it would be inappropriate to inquire about what claims are actually being released.

THE COURT: But here's what my job is: To make sure that this settlement between these parties is fair and reasonable under all the circumstances. It's not for me to opine and offer judicial guidance or an advisory opinion as to whether other cases that are offshoots should go forward in other jurisdictions. I'm looking at the two parties, and if they negotiate a settlement -- I didn't negotiate the settlement, they did, with the help of Judge Hochberg and a mediator, and it was at arm's length, and no one's disputing all of that. There are no other objectors in the room but you.

Is there one other objector?

MR. CECCHI: No.

THE COURT: No other objectors.

And so what I do is, I look at it holistically and say, as my role as District Court: Is this fair and reasonable under the circumstances? Does it protect the interests of the parties? Is it negotiated at arm's length? Does it satisfy the Girsh factors? That's what I have to do. And that doesn't mean I look to say, nor would I: Well, the carve-out language has to be clearer so that another judge looking at this in another jurisdiction can be

clear that it doesn't carve out that case. That's what I'm struggling with. And I think that's what Judge Linares said when he said in his order that Mr. McShane's motion is denied because he is not a member of either the direct purchaser plaintiffs or the indirect purchaser plaintiffs and has no standing to intervene in this action for the purpose of objecting to the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). That's exactly what he said.

MS. RICKERT: Yes. During the hearing, he did repeatedly ask them if they were actually purporting to release qui tam claims, and how and why, and whether any had been filed. He was actually concerned about that. I agree that that didn't make it into his order.

We're in a little bit of a tough spot because there is no question that they are attempting to release the claims that these clients and governments controlled.

THE COURT: Well, let me stop you for a minute.

You know, when you settle a lawsuit between parties, right, Defendants always want a broad release, and Plaintiff will agree to a general release, which is, everything up to this point.

And this release actually -- and a general release is, everything is gone, known or unknown up to this point.

That's a general release; right?

They made a carve-out, and it was a careful

carve-out, and the carve-out carves out in qui tam --

What's the language of the carve-out?

MR. CECCHI: To the extent we have the ability to, and as Your Honor articulated, it's exactly what

Judge Linares said the first time, that all I'm doing is opining on the fairness of the settlement, I'm not making any other ruling of the effect of this release for the state court judge. It's exactly what he said.

THE COURT: And the carve-out says?

MR. CECCHI: The qui tam claims are released as counsel articulated to the extent we have the ability to do so.

And that's my point about counsel's argument. If she's right, if counsel is right, then she wins in the state court. That's where the argument should be articulated, not here, because the settlement here says what it says. We negotiated it. And as Your Honor pointed out, this was at arm's length. None of these settlements would have gone forward without a broad general release. That's just the reality of how this works.

THE COURT: Anything else you want to add?

MS. RICKERT: Yes. I want to just add that, you know, either they are -- the claims are actually in jeopardy based on this release language, in which case, and I think they would later have an interest in the right to intervene,

or they aren't, and if the relator has no interest in this proceeding, it's because his claims cannot be affected by this release. So I would -- and in our motion, we ask in the alternative that if you're going to deny the motion to intervene that you do so on the basis that a later intervenor, relator in these other cases, that his interests are not at issue here because the settlement cannot affect his cases. I think that would be the only basis for finding that he has no right to intervene.

And I would also want to add, and I think Judge
Linares understood this when my colleague was at the last
hearing, that it's important for us to not have the State
Courts get the wrong impression and believe that this Court
is deciding that our claims are released. So he understood
that in the second hearing. He said, you know, preserve
whatever you need to preserve, and I will refer back to last
time, even though he denied the motion to intervene the
first time, he was very careful to say, nothing that I do
here is meant to affect the claims of Mr. McShane.

And so our coming in again today is because we need to continue to protect to Mr. McShane's rights, particularly in light of the actual motions that have been filed to try to dismiss his claims based on settlement in -- from this Court.

So we would ask that if you deny the motion to

1 intervene that you do include language about the lack of 2 effect on Mr. McShane's cases. 3 THE COURT: Anything to add? MR. CECCHI: I mean, that's what Judge Linares said on the record, and counsel said, the effect of the 5 release is for the state court judge, and we agreed to that, 6 and Mr. Newell agreed to that the first time around, and the second time around. And Judge Linares didn't offer an 9 advisory opinion to the state court about the effect of the release on those qui tam claims. The release says what it 10 11 says. It will be for that judge to decide whether those 12 claims, Mr. McShane's purported claims are released. So that's what happened, and we agree. 13 THE COURT: All right. I just want to look at 14 15 something that Judge Linares said, and I'll be back in five 16 minutes. 17 MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, before you leave, I have this issue, if I could raise for one second? 18 19 THE COURT: Sure. 20 MR. SHAPIRO: It's Jay Shapiro. Apparently, counsel for the Delta Defendants was 21 also supposed to be part of this call, but for some reason, 22 when I was patched in, they did not make it onto the call. 23 THE COURT: Well, they did, but they hung up. So 24

if they want to call back in, they're more than welcome to.

25

```
1
      If not, they can get a copy of the transcript.
2
                MS. RICKERT: Actually, I got a message that your
3
      staff asked me to patch them in. So I was going to do that.
4
      I just wanted to let you know.
                 THE COURT: Well, let me stop you.
5
6
                 You can patch them in.
7
                 They chose not to come in to court. When a lawyer
      chooses to participate by phone, they do it at their own
8
9
      risk. We have limited capability here, and if calls get
      dropped, I'm not going to stop the hearing, and that's the
10
11
      risk you run when you participate by phone.
12
                 I would ask you to extend them the courtesy of
      patching them in, and wait patiently, and they can
13
      participate and be heard if they have anything to offer when
14
15
      we resume.
16
                 Thank you.
17
                MR. SHAPIRO: I will do that, Your Honor.
      just trying to be helpful.
18
19
             (Recess taken)
20
                 THE COURT CLERK: All rise.
21
                 THE COURT: Have a seat, everyone.
22
                 I understand we have found the lost lawyer.
                MS. KEILTY: We have, Your Honor. I apologize for
23
      the inconvenience.
24
```

This is Kayleigh Keilty from Saul Ewing Arnstein &

25

Lehr on behalf of Delta Chemical, John Besson, and Rebecca Besson.

I appreciate the Court's patience.

THE COURT: No worries. We don't have conference capability, so it's best to have one lawyer call the other lawyer and we can all have it that way. Once you disconnect, we don't have a way to reconnect you. That was the problem.

But anyway, if you need to be heard before I make my ruling, you certainly have that opportunity.

All right. So where we left off was a request by Mr. McShane's lawyer that, if I don't grant the motion to intervene, to make some kind of language about the effect of the release in this matter as it relates to the qui tam matter.

and I'm struck by the fact that that identical argument was made before Judge Linares not that long ago, in November of '18, when we had one of the first settlements.

And this issue was addressed at length. This was not a collateral issue. It was addressed at length, it was argued at length, including by counsel for Mr. McShane, and the same exact issues that are raised here were raised then, and there was fulsome discussion about this precise issue happening, which would be how this release would affect the ability of the qui tam actions to go forward in the

respective jurisdictions. They may not have addressed, used the words "motion to dismiss," but certainly that was the whole point of McShane's counsel making the arguments then a year ago, which are the same arguments that are made now.

And a couple of things that Mr. Cecchi pointed out, but I read a little bit further for context, and this is the language we just talked about for the last 20 minutes. This is exactly what Judge Linares said at page 38, line -- I'll go back with the question:

"Well, people make claims all the time. That is something else in some other court might affect me, but you have the ability to make the argument, has to be real controversy just by virtue of him saying it might happen.

"The Court: Let me tell you this. I am not taking a position and this Court is not making a ruling today, and anything that I do with regard to this judgment today releases or terminates the qui tam action or affects them in any way, then it is up to the other courts to decide that issue. I am not taking a position and this Court is not making a ruling today that anything that I do with regard to this judgment today releases or terminates the qui tam action or affects them in any way."

That is the same language that counsel just asked for, and that's exactly what Judge Linares had previously said a year ago: Nothing I do will affect them in any way.

```
1
                 MR. CECCHI: Right.
2
                 THE COURT: That's his language.
                 MR. CECCHI: Right, and, Judge, we would agree
3
      that the same situation appertains today just as it at
      appertained then.
5
                 THE COURT: It would be extraordinary for me --
6
7
      let me just start with a little bit of the analysis.
                 So that's what Judge Linares says, and he goes on,
8
9
      and there was even some agreement by counsel on that point.
10
                 And then, Mr. Newell was counsel; correct?
11
                 MR. CECCHI: Yes, Judge.
12
                 THE COURT: This is what Judge Linares says:
                 "I can only decide what is in front of me, and
13
      what is in front of me is the fairness of the settlement and
14
15
      the appropriateness of the settlement. Whether or not there
16
      is a decision by another court what the effect of this is,
17
      it's going to be up to them, except it is going to be clear
      from this record I am speaking that all I am doing is
18
      settling the claims that are before me.
19
20
                 "Correct.
                 "Are we in agreement, Your Honor," Mr. Cecchi
21
22
      asks.
                 "The Court: All right, Mr. Newell?
23
                 "Mr. Newell: Yeah, I think that is fine, Your
24
              I think, you know --
25
      Honor.
```

"The Court: You will have the transcript, and you can quote it in your position brief when it happens. I think that what I said on the record, because I have authority to say that, but beyond that, I think most of what you are trying to get me to do was really -- was, A, you were straining into areas where you had no standing and asking me to get involved in claims that are not before the Court. But I think based on the statements I just made on the record, I think that gives you at least a comfort that you need in regard to the actions that are not pending before the Court.

"Mr. Newell: Yes, Your Honor.

"The Court: The issue is not whether or not there should be a final approval of the settlement. You sent a letter to the Court last night, counsel, advising me you may want to pursue this. I don't even know if the other attorneys have even had a chance to see it, but I'll deal with that when you make the particular motion pertaining to that. As far as objections, it is the same objection you raised before, you have done -- done by raising the objection here, but the same ruling that I made last time otherwise applies to here."

So I begin by saying that this is not a changed circumstance. This is not an extraordinary interest of justice, new fact or evidence that would require a different

analysis from what Judge Linares has addressed twice in two settlements that have already been approved by this Court that were litigated by Mr. McShane's counsel, and to some extent, he agreed with the language and the ruling that Judge Linares had made at that time, certainly in November of 2018.

And, while the Court has discretion in revisiting issues that were resolved earlier in a litigation, there really has to be some kind of extraordinary or at least some kind of compelling circumstances, whether there is new evidence available, a superseding law has been announced, or the earlier decision was erroneous or would create manifest injustice, and I am simply not satisfied that that standard is met.

There was an opportunity to more fulsomely have this reconsidered in a motion for reconsideration. It was not done. There was no appeal to the 3rd Circuit. And, in fact, it appears that counsel agreed to the language that Judge Linares stated on the record at the time that he made his ruling.

So, I'm satisfied that there's no basis to change the ruling of Judge Linares, and on that basis alone, I'm going to deny the motion, with the following thought that was certainly evident in Judge Linares's ruling, which is that this comes before me as a motion to approve a

settlement between the parties. The parties are the Plaintiffs and the Defendants here. My job is to make sure that it is fair and reasonable under all the circumstances and that the fee award is appropriate, not to relitigate and not to carve out and change negotiated language between the two parties. That was part of Judge Linares's ruling, and I'm satisfied that that is sound reasoning here today.

I am also not convinced, nor was Judge Linares, that Mr. McShane is a proper party to intervene. He seeks intervention, but I'm not convinced that he has sufficient interest in this action that is not adequately represented by the existing parties to the action. Mr. McShane is asserting qui tam actions in other courts, and those qui tams belong to the government entities on whom they are being asserted. He seeks to intervene in order to object to the settlement, but I'm not convinced he has standing to do so since he is not a class member and during the class period, and that is yet another reason to find that he does not have standing.

And to the extent that the municipalities' interests are being affected here, they have notice of this settlement, and they have not in any way objected to the settlement before the Court.

So, for all those reasons, I am denying again the motion to intervene, and for the reasons that were expressed

on the record and for the reasons expressed by Judge
Linares, I'm satisfied that there is no reason to come to a
different conclusion than he did twice, and the motions,
therefore, to intervene and object are both denied.

In terms of the alternate relief that's sought to make some kind of statement about the effect, I will refer any judge looking at this to look at the careful and considered words of Judge Linares in his November 14th, 2018 transcript. I'll rely on that.

All right. Let's get to the motion to approve.

Mr. Cecchi, do you want to give me just a brief
overview of the proposed settlement?

MR. CECCHI: Yes, Your Honor.

These, as we discussed, are the fourth, fifth, and sixth settlements in this antitrust MDL. They are all cash deals, and all of these agreements and settlements are fundamentally, as best we could, within the penumbra of trying to get it as close to market share as we could, given all of the other settlements, and given our analysis of the market, the size of the sales of each of these Defendants, and their relative culpabilities, we think all of the settlements are appropriate, and fair, reasonable, and adequate.

As Your Honor indicated, this litigation has been long, it's been hard fought. Millions of pages of documents

have been exchanged. The settlements were negotiated under the auspices of two experienced mediators, Judge Hochberg, who Your Honor knows, and David Geronemus, who is an experienced mediator with JAMS and clerked for Justice Stewart.

So, given the fact that there are no objections to the substance of the settlement, to the fairness of the settlement, I would rely on our final papers and the fact that, again, they're all essentially proportional to each other based upon market share.

In terms of our application for fees and expenses, we've set forth our arguments in the brief. This has been a long litigation. There have been many lawyers involved. If the fee request is granted, when everything is aggregated, we're still in a slightly negative multiplier position, and again, no one has objected to our latest fee request, and I am hopeful that Your Honor would grant it, and for that reason, I have prepared a proposed form of order.

But other than that, if Your Honor has any questions about the settlements, I'm prepared to answer them, but I think that they stand on their own merits.

THE COURT: Would anyone else like to be heard?

(No response)

THE COURT: All right. Like the similar settlements before me, I am prepared to approve this

settlement as being fair, reasonable, and adequate under the circumstances.

The 3rd Circuit directs us to look at the factors that are formally considered under the <u>Girsh</u> case, and here, all those factors militate in favor of approving the settlement.

The proposed settlement was negotiated at arm's length with the capable help of Judge Hochberg, and the case has been ongoing for many years now. I understand that there were her efforts, the efforts of the JAMS mediator, and that factor militates, again, in favor of approving the settlement.

I'm satisfied that the methodology that the parties have agreed to for distributing relief to the class, including the methodology for processing their claims, are also fair and reasonable, given the risks and the further delay that would inevitably result if the case went forward.

So, I am satisfied that this is a settlement that is made in good faith by strong counsel to a long and hard-fought case that is finally coming to an end, at least partially with respect to the overall claims in this larger case, and that I'm prepared to approve it.

I'm also inclined to and will approve the counsel fee award requested by counsel. The fee is in an amount of 33 percent of the settlement proceeds made available to the

direct purchaser settlement class, and expenses and contribution awards in the amount of \$10,000 to the named class representatives.

There are a couple of points to note here: That the result achieved, certainly one of the factors to be considered in assessing the strength of the attorneys' fee award, the common class fund here is over \$25 million, and that factor militates in favor of approval.

There are no objectors at all to the amount that is sought.

It's without question that this was a complex and long-fought litigation involving complex antitrust issues, certainly probably the top of the food chain in terms of difficulty and complexity of class actions, certainly class actions or multidistrict litigations. That factor certainly militates in favor of settlement.

There was certainly a risk of nonpayment here, given all the legal issues, and much time devoted by Plaintiffs' counsel, and, finally, this award is similar to awards approved in similar cases.

So, for those reasons, I am going to approve the settlement, and I'm also going to approve the fees, the out-of-pocket expenses, and the contribution awards to the parties.

I do not have a proposed form of order. Do you

45 1 have one? 2 MR. CECCHI: May I approach, Judge? 3 THE COURT: Sure. All right. Let me take a minute and look at this. Is there anything further? 5 I'll take a quick look at the order off the 6 record, and then I will give you a copy, and then I will 7 electronically file it today. 8 9 MR. CECCHI: Judge, there's just one housekeeping 10 item. In our exuberance responding to the motion to 11 12 intervene and object, we did indicate that we felt that perhaps there was an arquable Rule 11 issue here. We 13 formally withdraw that on the record. We have no intention 14 15 of proceeding. We fully understand after hearing argument, 16 hearing Your Honor's ruling why counsel in good faith 17 presented the arguments that she did, so we will not be 18 pursuing that, and we withdraw it. 19 THE COURT: Thank you, and I will terminate that 20 motion. Okay? MS. RICKERT: Your Honor, if I may, just quickly, 21 if there is a subsequent settlement that has the same 22 language that similarly could affect Mr. McShane, is there a 23 way for us to ask you to say, once again, that your ruling 24

is in no way intended to opine on the effects of that

25

release --

THE COURT: I can say that to the extent that this issue is raised again that my ruling -- I don't want to give an advance ruling, but you're certainly free to send in a letter. And I don't think I should be making advance rulings. I mean, what I said about referring to Judge Linares's reasoning applies certainly to this case, but there could be changed circumstances. I'm not going to say everything automatically applies for the rest of the case. You can certainly put in a letter. You don't have to appear; you can appear by phone. I can just reference today's hearing so the issue is preserved for you.

MR. CECCHI: Judge, we're happy to meet and confer. There is only one more settlement from direct purchaser class. We're happy to meet and confer and make it as soon as possible.

THE COURT: Yes, you don't have to come back again. Where did you travel from?

MS. RICKERT: Chicago.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I hope you had a nice day in New Jersey.

(Laughter)

THE COURT: And so you don't have to come back again, unless you want to, you know. You can certainly participate by phone or send me a letter, and I'm happy to

put you on the phone and say your arguments are preserved. MS. RICKERT: Okay. THE COURT: All right? Thank you. All right. Let me take a minute with this order and I will be right back. MR. CECCHI: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. THE COURT CLERK: All rise. (Matter concluded) Pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, the following transcript is certified to be an accurate record as taken stenographically in the above entitled proceedings. s/CHARLES P. McGUIRE, C.C.R.